Minds and Machines

Articles from the Journal of Evolution and Technology...

"Vulnerable Cyborgs: Learning to Live with our Dragons"

by

Mark Coeckelbergh

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

November 2011

Abstract:

Transhumanist visions appear to aim at invulnerability. We are invited to fight the dragon of death and disease, to shed our old, human bodies, and to live on as invulnerable minds or cyborgs. This paper argues that even if we managed to enhance humans in one of these ways, we would remain highly vulnerable entities given the fundamentally relational and dependent nature of posthuman existence. After discussing the need for minds to be embodied, the issue of disease and death in the infosphere, and problems of psychological, social and axiological vulnerability, I conclude that transhumanist human enhancement would not erase our current vulnerabilities, but instead transform them. Although the struggle against vulnerability is typically human and would probably continue to mark posthumans, we had better recognize that we can never win that fight and that the many dragons that threaten us are part of us. As vulnerable humans and posthumans, we are at once the hero and the dragon.

"Vulnerable Cyborgs: Learning to Live with our Dragons"

"Misbehaving Machines: The Emulated Brains of Transhumanist Dreams"

by

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

November 2011

Abstract:

Enhancement technologies may someday grant us capacities far beyond what we now consider humanly possible. Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg suggest that we might survive the deaths of our physical bodies by living as computer emulations.­­ In 2008, they issued a report, or “roadmap,” from a conference where experts in all relevant fields collaborated to determine the path to “whole brain emulation.” Advancing this technology could also aid philosophical research. Their “roadmap” defends certain philosophical assumptions required for this technology’s success, so by determining the reasons why it succeeds or fails, we can obtain empirical data for philosophical debates regarding our mind and selfhood. The scope ranges widely, so I merely survey some possibilities, namely, I argue that this technology could help us determine (1) if the mind is an emergent phenomenon, (2) if analog technology is necessary for brain emulation, and (3) if neural randomness is so wild that a complete emulation is impossible.

"Misbehaving Machines: The Emulated Brains of Transhumanist Dreams"

"Ray Kurzweil and Uploading: Just Say No!"

by

Nicholas Agar

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

November 2011

Abstract:

There is a debate about the possibility of mind-uploading – a process that purportedly transfers human minds and therefore human identities into computers. This paper bypasses the debate about the metaphysics of mind-uploading to address the rationality of submitting yourself to it. I argue that an ineliminable risk that mind-uploading will fail makes it prudentially irrational for humans to undergo it.

"Ray Kurzweil and Uploading: Just Say No!"

"Personal Identity and Uploading"

by

Mark Walker

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

November 2011

Abstract:

Objections to uploading may be parsed into substrate issues, dealing with the computer platform of upload and personal identity. This paper argues that the personal identity issues of uploading are no more or less challenging than those of bodily transfer often discussed in the philosophical literature. It is argued that what is important in personal identity involves both token and type identity. While uploading does not preserve token identity, it does save type identity; and even qua token, one may have good reason to think that the preservation of the type is worth the cost.

"Personal Identity and Uploading"

"Fictional Entities and Augmented Reality: A Metaphysical Impossibility Result"

by

Jeff Buechner

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

November 2011

Abstract:

The transhumanism project will gain momentum with advances in technology, in basic science and in philosophy, as well as in bioethics. However, there are minefields that jeopardize this progress – one such minefield is a fundamental problem in pure philosophy: fictional entities and how we refer to the nonexistent. In the absence of solutions to the problems that arise in this area of philosophy, progress in the technology necessary for augmented reality will be considerably impeded. I will argue there are forms of augmented reality that are metaphysically impossible and that believing that such forms are possible (both metaphysically and physically) creates a form of skepticism.

"Fictional Entities and Augmented Reality: A Metaphysical Impossibility Result"

"Viva Whenever: Suspended and Expanded Bodies in Time"

by

Kim Lacey

Journal of Evolution and Technology

Volume 22

Issue 1

December 2011

Abstract:

In this paper, I investigate suspension under two guises: digital and pharmaceutical. These two versions of suspension interrogate the limits of the body to different extents. The former highlights our increasing desire and need to externalize and supplement what our physical bodies are incapable of doing – perfect, un-influenced storage capacity. The latter example illustrates the continued need for the physical body, but shows that the demands on the body are changed with age or desire to activate or suppress biological processes.

"Viva Whenever: Suspended and Expanded Bodies in Time"